chore: pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs#413
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Pin all third-party GitHub Action references to full commit SHAs with the version tag preserved as a trailing comment, per advisory-space ADR 0006 (SHA pinning for GitHub Actions). This mitigates supply-chain risk from mutable tags that can be silently retagged. Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>
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Type of Change
Description
Pins every third-party GitHub Action reference in this repo to a full 40-character commit SHA, with the human-readable version tag preserved as a trailing comment. This implements the org-wide policy from advisory-space ADR 0006 — SHA Pinning for GitHub Actions.
Why: Mutable tags (
@v4,@v2.6.1) can be silently moved or rewritten by a maintainer or an attacker with repo access. Thetj-actions/changed-filesandcodecov/codecov-actionsupply-chain compromises in 2025 showed that consumers pinning to tags executed tampered code without any change to their workflow files. A commit SHA is immutable; pinning to it guarantees the exact code that runs.Pinned references:
actions/checkout→df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10(v6)jdx/mise-action→1648a7812b9aeae629881980618f079932869151(v4)actions/upload-artifact→043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a(v7)cla-assistant/github-action→ca4a40a7d1004f18d9960b404b97e5f30a505a08(v2.6.1)Staffbase/gha-workflows/.../template_automerge_dependabot.yml→9ea5ca06a1ef865b0af9745b47ea74b731b65fc5(v13.4.1)Staffbase/gha-workflows/.../template_release_drafter.yml→9ea5ca06a1ef865b0af9745b47ea74b731b65fc5(v13.4.1)The local
uses: ./reference inintegration.ymlis left untouched (not a third-party reference). Dependabot is already configured for thegithub-actionsecosystem in.github/dependabot.ymland will keep these SHAs current.Checklist
The changes and the PR were generated by Claude.