Python: feat(python): Add local-codeact package with AST validation#6091
Python: feat(python): Add local-codeact package with AST validation#6091eavanvalkenburg wants to merge 11 commits into
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Pull request overview
Adds a new alpha Python workspace package, agent-framework-local-codeact, intended to enable CodeAct-style execution of model-generated Python in externally sandboxed environments (e.g., Foundry hosted agents), with subprocess execution, file-mount capture, and AST-based validation.
Changes:
- Registers
agent-framework-local-codeactin the Python workspace (uv/pyproject) and marks it as alpha inPACKAGE_STATUS.md. - Introduces
LocalExecuteCodeTool/LocalCodeActProviderwith subprocess runner + IPC bridge, file-mount capture helpers, and dynamic instructions. - Adds unit tests plus usage samples and package documentation.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 20 out of 22 changed files in this pull request and generated 7 comments.
Show a summary per file
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| python/uv.lock | Adds the new editable workspace member and lock metadata. |
| python/pyproject.toml | Registers the new workspace package. |
| python/PACKAGE_STATUS.md | Marks agent-framework-local-codeact as alpha. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/pyproject.toml | New package definition, tooling config, and test tasks. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/README.md | Package docs, security posture, and configuration surface. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/AGENTS.md | Package architecture and contributor notes. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/LICENSE | MIT license for the new package. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/agent_framework_local_codeact/init.py | Public API exports for the package. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/agent_framework_local_codeact/_types.py | Public types for execution mode, mounts, and limits. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/agent_framework_local_codeact/_validator.py | AST-based code validation layer. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/agent_framework_local_codeact/_bridge.py | Parent-side subprocess bridge + tool dispatch. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/agent_framework_local_codeact/_runner.py | Child-process runner implementing the JSON-lines protocol. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/agent_framework_local_codeact/_files.py | Mount normalization + symlink-safe file capture. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/agent_framework_local_codeact/_instructions.py | Dynamic CodeAct instructions and tool descriptions. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/agent_framework_local_codeact/_execute_code_tool.py | Main execute_code tool orchestration and output shaping. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/agent_framework_local_codeact/_provider.py | Context provider that injects the run-scoped tool + instructions. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/tests/local_codeact/test_validator.py | Validator allow/block behavior tests. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/tests/local_codeact/test_local_codeact.py | Tool/provider behavior, subprocess execution, mounts, and limits tests. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/samples/README.md | Sample index and run instructions. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/samples/local_execute_code.py | Local usage sample for direct tool invocation. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/samples/foundry_hosted_agent.py | Foundry hosted-agent wiring sample. |
| python/packages/local_codeact/agent_framework_local_codeact/py.typed | Marks the package as typed. |
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Automated Code Review
Reviewers: 4 | Confidence: 88%
✓ Correctness
After thorough examination of the local-codeact package implementation, I found no correctness bugs. The code demonstrates excellent engineering practices: proper error handling with early validation, safe resource cleanup using try-finally blocks and context managers, correct subprocess management with timeout handling, secure AST validation with comprehensive allow/block lists, and proper IPC serialization with JSON-safe conversions. All test assertions correctly match the implementation behavior. The Windows environment variable handling (SYSTEMROOT, COMSPEC, PATHEXT) is intentional and necessary for subprocess creation. The validator's permissive approach to user-defined functions is documented and tested. Edge cases like subprocess death, tool call failures, timeout during execution, and symlink handling are all properly managed.
✓ Security Reliability
The local CodeAct package provides defense-in-depth controls for executing LLM-generated Python code, with AST validation, subprocess isolation, and explicit environment control. The implementation is generally sound for its stated purpose (use in external sandboxes like Foundry). However, there are three reliability concerns: (1) the AST validator allows 'open' in ALLOWED_BUILTINS while blocking it in BLOCKED_BUILTINS, creating conflicting policy; (2) subprocess environment building on Windows includes parent environment keys that could leak sensitive data; (3) the validator allows delattr/setattr which could modify object internals unsafely. The package correctly disclaims being a security sandbox and documents required external isolation.
✓ Test Coverage
The test suite provides solid coverage of core functionality (subprocess execution, tool calling, validation, file capture, environment isolation). However, several edge cases and error paths lack coverage: (1) invalid input validation for constructors (empty/invalid paths, negative limits), (2) error handling for subprocess failures (invalid Python executable, runner script errors, malformed bridge responses), (3) boundary conditions for limits (exact limit sizes, total capture limits), (4) file mount edge cases (duplicate mounts, overlapping paths, permission errors), (5) race conditions in async tool calls, and (6) error recovery paths in the bridge protocol. The existing tests are well-structured and verify the happy paths thoroughly.
✓ Design Approach
The design approach is sound for the stated goal of adding AST-validated local code execution for Foundry hosted agents. The validation correctly runs before all execution paths, the subprocess bridge properly serializes concurrent tool calls via async locks, symlink handling prevents directory traversal, and the custom allow/block list semantics are clearly documented. All test cases in the diff are consistent with the implementation.
Automated review by eavanvalkenburg's agents
- Remove 'open', 'getattr', 'setattr', 'hasattr' from ALLOWED_BUILTINS (bypass risk) - Add these to BLOCKED_BUILTINS with explanatory comments - Propagate AST validation settings to create_run_tool snapshot - Terminate subprocess before raising on error messages - Move module docstrings to file start in samples - Remove pointless string statements from samples - Document allowed_builtins behavior in visit_Call Fixes all 8 review comments in PR microsoft#6091
Review Comments AddressedAll 8 review comments have been addressed in commit a38ea7c: Security Fixes
Implementation Fixes
Sample Fixes
All checks passing locally:
|
Python 3.10 Compatibility FixedFixed timeout test that was failing on Python 3.10 due to different TimeoutError string representation. Commit: 4760db8 Verified on:
All 46 tests now pass on both versions. |
- Remove 'open', 'getattr', 'setattr', 'hasattr' from ALLOWED_BUILTINS (bypass risk) - Add these to BLOCKED_BUILTINS with explanatory comments - Propagate AST validation settings to create_run_tool snapshot - Terminate subprocess before raising on error messages - Move module docstrings to file start in samples - Remove pointless string statements from samples - Document allowed_builtins behavior in visit_Call Fixes all 8 review comments in PR microsoft#6091
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Add agent-framework-local-codeact alpha package for running LLM-generated Python code in Foundry hosted agents and other sandboxed environments. Key features: - Subprocess execution by default (isolated process) - Optional unsafe in-process mode for debugging - AST-based allow-list code validation - Customizable allowed/blocked imports and builtins - Host tool bridge with framed JSON-lines IPC - File mount system with capture and limits - .NET portability features (python_executable, runner_script) Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
- Remove 'open', 'getattr', 'setattr', 'hasattr' from ALLOWED_BUILTINS (bypass risk) - Add these to BLOCKED_BUILTINS with explanatory comments - Propagate AST validation settings to create_run_tool snapshot - Terminate subprocess before raising on error messages - Move module docstrings to file start in samples - Remove pointless string statements from samples - Document allowed_builtins behavior in visit_Call Fixes all 8 review comments in PR microsoft#6091
Python 3.10's TimeoutError has a different string representation than 3.11+. Update test to check for 'TimeoutError' instead of specific message content. Verified on Python 3.10.15 and 3.12.7.
- _validator.py: visit_Call now enforces ALLOWED_BUILTINS for names that match real Python builtins, while still treating unknown names as user-defined functions/registered tools. This makes the allowed_builtins parameter behave as a real allow-list. - _bridge.py / _runner.py: add explicit '# nosec' markers next to the existing '# noqa: S102/S404' so bandit accepts the intentional subprocess import and exec() calls (this package's whole purpose). - test_validator.py: add tests for unknown-builtin rejection, user-defined function acceptance, and custom allow-list expansion. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
On Windows a freshly-killed subprocess can briefly hold the temporary workspace directory open. Swallow OSError from temp_dir.cleanup() so the caller still receives the proper error Content from the run and so the timeout test passes on Windows. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Ruff SIM105 prefers contextlib.suppress over try/except/pass. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
The previous OSError-only suppression missed the RecursionError that Python's TemporaryDirectory cleanup can raise on Windows when a freshly killed subprocess still holds a handle to the workspace. Pass ignore_cleanup_errors=True (Python 3.10+) so the platform stops retrying rmtree, and broaden the outer suppression so unexpected cleanup errors do not mask the actual run result. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Model the sample after the hyperlight_codeact container sample: register compute and fetch_data as sandbox-only host tools on LocalCodeActProvider, wire a FoundryChatClient-backed agent, and serve via ResponsesHostServer. Update samples README with the new run/request instructions. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Add a note to the sample docstring and the samples README directing readers to python/samples/04-hosting/foundry-hosted-agents/responses for the surrounding Foundry hosted-agent environment, Dockerfile, manifest, and deployment workflow. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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Automated Code Review
Reviewers: 2 | Confidence: 77%
✓ Test Coverage
No actionable issues found in this dimension.
✓ Design Approach
The validator currently documents that
osis restricted toos.environandos.path, but the implementation only blocks a deny-list of dangerousos.*members. That leaves many otheroscapabilities available even though the package contract says they are not, so I would request changes on that design mismatch.
Automated review by eavanvalkenburg's agents
Address Copilot review: the validator's deny-list for os.* attributes was
broader than the documented contract ('os.environ and os.path only') so
attributes like os.listdir, os.open, and os.getcwd slipped through. Replace
the deny-list with an allow-list of {environ, path} threaded through
validator -> tool -> provider via a new allowed_os_attrs parameter.
Harden virtual mount-path handling so a mount cannot be tricked into
surfacing protected host data:
- resolve_existing_directory rejects symlinked mount roots so a mount whose
host_path is itself a symlink cannot expose another directory.
- iter_real_files skips hardlinks (st_nlink > 1) and requires every entry's
resolved path to stay under the mount root, defeating ln-based
hardlink-into-mount and junction-style escapes.
Update README to document the virtual-mount-paths-are-labels contract,
the os.* allow-list, and the capture-time defenses. Add tests covering
os.listdir/os.open/os.getcwd rejection, allowed_os_attrs override, hardlink
skipping, and symlinked-mount-root rejection.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Motivation and Context
Foundry hosted agents already run inside a sandboxed container, which makes them
a viable target for the CodeAct pattern without the heavyweight isolation that
Hyperlight or Monty bring. We want a lightweight, in-process variant that lets
agents author and execute Python in the host environment with as many guard
rails as possible, while being explicit that the package is only safe to use
when the surrounding environment is already a sandbox.
This PR adds a new alpha package
agent-framework-local-codeactthat:agent-framework-hyperlightandagent-framework-monty, so users can swap providers without changing theiragent code.
a workspace tempdir, and offers an opt-in
unsafe_in_processmode for trustedsetups.
runs, with user-overridable
allowed_imports/allowed_builtins(deny-listoverrides also available for the rare opt-in case).
call_tool(...)(model only seesexecute_code), file mounts, environment variables, and configurable byte andtime limits.
hyperlight_codeactcontainer sample, and a standalone direct-invocationsample.
Description
New package layout (
python/packages/local_codeact/):LocalCodeActProvider— context provider that injects anexecute_codetoolplus CodeAct instructions; same shape as the Hyperlight/Monty providers.
LocalExecuteCodeTool— the underlying tool with all configuration knobs(host tools, approval mode, workspace, file mounts, env, limits, execution
mode, allow/deny lists for imports and builtins).
_validator.py— AST-based allow-list validator run before any execution,enforcing imports, builtin usage, and rejecting dynamic-eval constructs.
_runner.py/_bridge.py— subprocess runner and JSON bridge protocol usedto invoke the embedded Python runner.
_files.py— file-mount handling with size caps and read/read-write modes.ProcessExecutionLimits— timeout and per-stream/per-file byte limits.samples/foundry_hosted_agent.py(Foundry Responses host) andsamples/local_execute_code.py(direct tool invocation), plussamples/README.md.tests/local_codeact/covering the provider, tool, validator,runner, file-mount handling, and the Windows tempdir-cleanup race.
python/PACKAGE_STATUS.mdas alpha. No lazy-loading incore yet (per alpha guidance); samples live inside the package.
Notes:
subprocesswith explicit Python executable.both are supported on
LocalCodeActProviderandLocalExecuteCodeTool.tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(ignore_cleanup_errors=True)and a broadcontextlib.suppress(Exception)around the final cleanup.Contribution Checklist