fix(tooling): allow unsafe pulls from forks#725
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| uses: actions/checkout@v6 | ||
| with: | ||
| ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} | ||
| allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true |
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When a fork PR is given the validated label, this opts out of checkout's pull_request_target protection while the workflow has repo secrets in its top-level env and immediately runs the checked-out PR's yarn/lint scripts. GitHub's checkout docs say allow-unsafe-pr-checkout should be used only after confirming checked-out code is never executed (docs); here a malicious package script can exfiltrate the PW_* credentials. Run PR code under pull_request without secrets, or keep this privileged workflow on trusted/base code only.
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bhabalan
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bhabalan
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Approving for now till we find a permanent fix
bhabalan
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bhabalan
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Approving for now till we find a permanent fix
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mkesavan13
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mkesavan13
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Approving for now. Need to work on long-term solution
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COMPLETES #N/A
This pull request addresses
The pull_request_target workflow was failing when checking out fork pull request code because actions/checkout now requires explicit opt-in for checking out PR head code in this trusted workflow context.
by making the following changes
Added allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true to each actions/checkout@v6 step in .github/workflows/pull-request.yml that checks out github.event.pull_request.head.sha, while keeping persist-credentials: false in place.
Change Type
The following scenarios were tested
The GAI Coding Policy And Copyright Annotation Best Practices
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